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Encoded Weakening of the European Integration – The EU-specific Vectors of
Disorientegration
The paper attempts to contribute to the better understanding of how the centrifugal force towards
weakening European integration has developed by identifying the EU-specific vectors of such gradient. We
argue that disorientegration is an echo effect of a complex amalgam of mutually intertwined and
interrelated mechanisms embedded secularly into our European integration process. The paper also
addresses whether secular stagnation adds to that centrifugal force. The paper finally outlines at least six
potential principles of reversing the European disorientegration by cultivating contingency governance.
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1. Introduction
After a long period of shyness, economists in various internationally renowned institutions are drifting
towards some sort of delusion of grandeur in terms of publishing ever-more optimistic economic outlooks
in the developed world including the European Union (EU). Indeed, it seems that the year 2017 was by far
the best since 2011 and forecasts have been continuously upwardly updated for 2018 due to unusually
good growth conditions (e.g. in 2017, Euro area’s growth rate was 2.4%, while it was 1.8% in Japan and
2,3% in the US).
Still, some moderation is in order even in the case of the EU owing to different systemic risks such
as (i) the looming global trade war(s) between Washington and Beijing affecting the European economy as
well; (ii) cumbersome completion of the EU single market due to outlining East-West EU splits together with
Brexit (i.e. Germany treats complex economic relations with the UK and will be affected negatively by Brexit,
so as the Central and Eastern European member states via the German situation); and last but not at all
least, (iii) populism and euroscepticism with a habit of springing back again and again (e.g. by the Summer
of 2018, the Italian coalition government earmarked with right-wing populism was set up; the Spanish prime
minister was forced out after losing the no-confidence vote as an end result of the so-called Gürtel-
corruption scandal); and last but not at all least (iv) governmental intentions and end results are not
necessarily the same, as Milton Friedman (1977) illustrated, so the governance and the effectiveness of
policies face huge challenges in our complex socio-economic innovation ecosystem (e.g. in 2018, the EU still
has not achieved the aim of the Lisbon Agenda to make the EU the most dynamic and competitive
knowledge-based economy in the world even though this was planned to be fulfilled by 20101). Thus, risks
and challenges are here to stay in the EU, which still has the potential to continue its secular
disorientegration manifesting in loosing orientation and weakening integration.
The present paper addresses the question of what are the main EU-specific mechanisms behind the
secular “disorientegration” of the European Union. With the deciphered vectors that are strongly
intertwined and are creating ambiguous situations, the encoded disorientegrative centrifugal trend is
revealed. In addition, we also argue that the secular stagnation phenomena adds to such disorientegrative
trend in Europe via rising additional policy related uncertainties. Finally, some potential principles are
formulated relevant for a governance working on reversing such disorientegrative trend.
This paper was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
1 European Commission (2018) emphasises that EU should invest much more in the creation of the most innovative knowledge-
based economy by being more ambitious in supporting breakthrough innovation.
22. EU-specific vectors of disorientegration
The following aspects and their dynamic configuration are taken into account: (1) disorientegrational
conditions as a result of EU enlargement (i.e. differences in various dimensions); (2) internal processes
within the EU in which the outlined differences appear; (3) external processes forming common challenges.
All of the following aspects are strongly interlinked and intertwined and create ambiguous situations.
2.1 Disorientegrational conditions given by EU enlargement
It has been long recognised with regard to complex systems that one can never map and know with full
certainty what the beginning conditions were, and even tiny differences in the conditions at the beginning
can result in large non-linear changes and instabilities later on. EU enlargements have gradually encoded
ever-more instability into the European integration process due to the differences manifesting in: (i) the
levels of economic development of countries; and (ii) cultural backgrounds as well as mental attitudes of
countries.
As far as the disparities between already in and accession countries in economic development levels
are concerned, integration-theorists have a predilection to consider the differing beginning economic
conditions as one of the singular point of references when explaining the causes of later shortcomings of
the integration (e.g. problems of EMU). As it is discernible on Chart 1, along the course of enlargements,
the gap between the average development levels of already in and accession countries measured in GDP
per capita was growing except the occasion of 4th enlargement which also encoded even more gaping gap
later on (e.g. accession countries reached the average development levels of already in countries along the
seven enlargements as follows: 76%, 52%, 41%, 113%, 40%, 19%, and 39%, respectively).
Chart 1. The economic development gap between already in and accession countries
(%, GDP per capita, current US$)
Source: own compilation based on World Development Indicators, World Bank.
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3Chart 2. The human development gap between already in and accession countries (HDI)
Note: HDI is on a range from 0 to 1. Due to the lack of data, the following years were used to cover enlargement periods:
1980 (1st and 2nd enlargements), 1985 (3rd and 4th enlargements), 2005 (5th and 6th enlargements), and 2014 for the Croatian
accession.
Source: data stem from the United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports.
If one looks at the average discrepancies in Human Development Index (HDI)2 along the enlargement
process between already in and accession countries, it can be stressed that relatively huge average
differences were prevalent except the 1st and 4th enlargements (Chart 2).
Despite the unimpeachable and well-documented fact on disparities (Seers et al. 1979, 1980, 1982;
Magone et al. 2016), we argue that the culprit was also related to the lack of internal national commitment
to stimulate structural change in line with the requirements of sustainable growth and development after
the accession. Further enlargements limited the space for further integration, in other words, European
integration was again and again diluted but not firmly deepened. In some cases, with accession (including
the access to the European Structural and Investment Funds) funds proved to be benevolent auxiliary
instruments to enlightened national public policy geared towards structural change (e.g. shifting to
knowledge economy in Denmark, Finland). In other cases the European Union’s essential promise has
become ‘money’ rather than the peaceful milieu being conducive to human flourishing and money was
subjected to be absorbed and allocated inefficiently by malfunctioning institutions in some cases, hence
contributing to the conversation of lower international competitiveness (e.g. Portugal, Greece).3 It is hardly
by chance that the particularly strong supporter of the Single Market were mostly the peripheral countries
by the end of 1980s (e.g. Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland) and the support for further enlargement
was to some extent evaporated in case of old member states by 2005.4 Success after accession always
depended and still relies on good governance with efficient institutional architecture embedded into the
2 HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being
knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three
dimensions.
3 Finland could transform itself to be a competitive knowledge economy, while Portugal was mostly unable to orchestrate such
change successfully because of a mixture of internal phenomena: state captured by welfare clientele led to excessive social and
wage policy which offered a fertile ground for worsening productivity as well as income inequality levels over decades and
unsustainable public finances. See: Kovács (2015).
4 See: Eurobarometer No. 34, European Commission (1990:31). By 2005, the support for further enlargement increased only
in Central and Eastern European Member States. European Commission (2005:30).
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4wider innovation eco-system. An important implication is that addressing structural weaknesses at national
levels cannot be bypassed even by creating fiscal federalism at EU level with its transfer system.5
Let us add immediately that the differences, at the same time, provided the magnetic force of further
integration, while inertia was also observable in certain enlargements. The accession of Greece in 1981 was
an extraordinarily glaring example of dominating political interest over economic rationale. Inertia in the
2nd and 3rd enlargements were encoded mainly because (i) French had become committed to initiating the
Greek accession in case of a democratic transition; (ii) and, what is more, there was a threat of revitalizing
communistic ideas in Italy, Portugal and Spain in case of the potential rejection of Greece as cradle of
Periclean democracy. As a result of such uncertainty, the European Community had to prefer their accession
as a reward for democratization, which was, a value-congruent political decision.6 Still, by now and in the
shadow of the present Eurozone crisis related to Greece, the Greek accession is widely considered as a
mistake7, whereas more crucial causes arose later in time.8 This is because voters tend to evaluate a policy
decision in retrospect on the basis whether it has led to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ outcomes instead of considering
whether the given decision was rationale and logical on the basis of available information and knowledge
in the given historical context when the decision was made. This also lends support to the impression that
disorientegration narrative is here in town.
As far as the differences in cultural backgrounds and mental attitudes of countries are concerned,
beyond the trivial and usual suspect (e.g. linguistic difference which explains the most the less than
expected labour mobility within the EU9), one must recognise that the harmony criteria between formal
(laws, regulation, constitution etc.) and informal (norms, culture etc.) institutions does not only apply on
national level to enhance growth and socio-economic development, but also on supranational level in
supporting sustainable European integration. The presence of this harmony would mean that EU
integration has national politics not biased extremely towards the aim at evading the violation of their
country’s cultural norms. With the lack of political union, this is only a phantasmagoria in the context of the
EU and, as Guiso et al. (2016) demonstrate, the development of efficient policies along the interaction of
countries can fall short and get impaired. EU countries greatly vary across institutional quality (Chart 3).
Countries with higher institutional quality appears to be less reliant on other EU countries in terms of
product export (e.g. Finland, Sweden, Germany etc.) because they are typically more innovative and have
deeper embeddedness into the global economy. GROUP 2 countries tend to bear harmony between formal
and informal institutions in a more vigorous way. As Chart 4 depicts, lower institutional quality is mainly
associated with lower economic integration in case of Mediterranean peripheral countries (e.g. Portugal,
Greece, Italy etc.) having structural backlog (i.e. low share of technology driven industries, high share of
labour intensive industries as Aiginger (2013:42) underscored).10
5 One must not forget the fact that even the theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal federalism conveys that national
governance plays a key role in it, and this is the way the system offers ‘laboratory’ to elaborate better and more efficient
policies in parallel via trial and error, i.e. more innovation freedom over time. See the Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, by
Ahmad et al. (2006). Still, fiscal federalism as the highest form of decentralised fiscal governance has uncertainties over how
does it affect economic growth and development (Baskaran et al. 2016). It is now empirically justified that income inequality
has been significantly rising since the 1970s even in Germany with its federal structure having the famous Finanzausgelich
mechanism. See the book written by the president of the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Fratzscher (2016).
6 Spain had submitted its application to the European Community already in 1970, however, it did not receive an answer for a
long period of time due to the existence of undemocratic governmental institutions in Spain. It demanded the accession again
in 1977. After lengthy bargaining and discussions, the Treaty of Accession was signed only in 1985. On the threat of communist
comeback, see: Seers (1982:6-7).
7 For a long time, studies on evaluating the costs and benefits of EU enlargements accentuated that enlargements were more
or less beneficial for core, more developed countries – even for the UK, see Crafts (2015) – while they were more costly for
poorer, peripheral countries who absorbed enormous amount of EU Funds over decades (e.g. Ederveen et al. 2006). Still,
funds supported the catching up process especially in case of Spain and Portugal (OECD, 1991). Recent studies emphasise
that EU membership have significantly outweighed the costs except the case of Greece, see for instance Campos et al. (2014).
8 For a systemic and comprehensive account on the Greek development with EU funds, see: Liargovas et al. (2015).
9 See: Andor (2014) or Chakrabarti and Sengupta (2015).
10 Economic growth of Greece (and together with that the possibility of reducing the debt ratio) is mainly based on sectors
(tourism, catering trade) whose international competitiveness can be considered low (even compared to other periphery
5Chart 3. Institutional quality and export-based economic integration
Note: horizontal axis refers to the score of countries in institutional quality derived from the World Economic Forum, Global
Competitiveness Yearbook 2014-2015. Vertical axis refers to the degree of economic integration in terms of export to EU
countries in percentage of GDP. The intersection represents the averages of the two indicators.
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Yearbook 2014-2015, Eurostat.
Another equally important aspect of informal institutional differences is the cross-cultural psychology
culture. For instance, let us take the degree of individualism and that of collectivism within the cultural
matrices of countries. In this respect, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) found a strong causal link from
individualism to innovation and long run growth. It is not surprising that GROUP 1 and GROUP 2 countries
have higher average scores on individualism compared to GROUP 3 and GROUP 4 (the averages are as
follows: 71, 69, 51, and 51, respectively).11 This cleavage seems to be able to encode instability into the
European integration process simply because more collectivist countries are likely to prefer the
unsustainable extension of welfare states – as the cases of Portugal and Greece have shown – which, in
turn, can ultimately stifle grassroots innovation. Bearing in mind that the degree of individualism might also
be a good proxy of the propensity of people to act in solidarity (i.e. to take sacrifices at the benefit of others
in the EU in time of crises via cooperation), from a broader perspective, technological development induced
individualism12 can result in higher focus on status-seeking at the expense of caring relationships
(collaborations), which is equivalent with a trend towards more intergovernmentalism rather than to
cooperation in creating federalist institutional architecture in the context of the European Union. This can
even shed light on such disorientegrational force like the United Kingdome’s vote in June 2016 to leave the
EU, which traditionally shows one of the highest degrees of individualism. Disorientation thus appears to
be a culturally strongly influenced phenomena as well in the European integration.
countries, e.g. Spain). See: World Economic Forum, Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report 2015. Greece is only the 31st
among the 141 countries in the ranking, while Spain is the 1st, Italy is the 8th and Portugal is the 15th. Available:
http://reports.weforum.org/travel-and-tourism-competitiveness-report-2015/ Accessed on: 01.06.2018
11 These are the Hofstede scores of individualism. Individualism is defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework
in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Available: https://geert-
hofstede.com Accessed on: 01.06.2018
12 A paper by Snower and Bosworth (2016) demonstrates how technological development (e.g. ICT gives rise to flexible work
pattern, increasing focus on individualistic traits etc.) induces more individualism which also has negative impetus on societal
welfare in the form of decreasing caring activities.
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62.2 Internal processes within the EU in which the outlined differences appear
The indicated different conditions with, of course, a variety of national interests along the course of
deepening and widening led to more and more conspicuous differentiations especially since the 1990s.13
The most obvious examples of such differentiations were mirrored in (1) the Schengen Area; (2) and the
Eurozone architecture. Albeit, differentiation was necessary and inevitable to accommodate the increasing
heterogeneity with enlargements; differentiation created side-effects that have been developing in
commonly unnoticed increments by manifesting the so-called ‘creeping normalcy’ for a relatively long
period of time, up to the 2008 financial and economic turmoil, the ensuing Eurozone crisis and migration
as well as refugee crisis.
Concerning the Schengen Area which reifies the free movement of people within the EU, the
Agreement came into force in 1995 and now 22 out of 28 EU Member States are involved in it together with
the following participating countries Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. By eliminating internal
border controls and providing passport-free movement of people along the series of enlargements, on the
one hand, and by having ineffective external border control management on the other hand, the European
integration encoded negative side effects of Schengen as well. These side-effects have occurred dynamically
on at least two fronts: (i) increasing tensions about immigration; (ii) and controversial understanding over
the costs and benefits of EU-migrants.
As for the rising tensions about immigration are concerned, one can assert that the social
integration of immigrants has been beset with pressing difficulties. First, generations of immigrants could
not effectively be integrated into the European societies by contributing to the co-existence of communities
along ethnic and religious lines. The prime example of this was the French riots of 2005 that proved what
was officially admitted later on by high-level representatives of the republic: the soft integration à la
française failed (Moran – Waddington, 2016). This was a clear harbinger of the evolvement of critical
instabilities through secessionism in core and northern European countries. By now, riots have become a
European phenomenon.14 Second, with the Eastern enlargement core countries became an important
attractor of Romanian and Bulgarian Romani by vitiating the local support of the EU. This led to effective
tensions and acts. For example, the series of fierce confrontations between Romani and French police in
2010 resulted in a divisive Presidential decision which called for spectacular expulsion of Romani people
from France and the demolition of illegal Roma camps. Since 2008, similar crackdowns occurred in Italy on
illegal immigrants, mostly Roma people from Romania being responsible for increasing crime. As a corollary,
voices were echoed over creating more stringent policies on immigration by refining the Schengen
Agreement. In 2011, Italy and France called for a strict review of the Agreement in fearing the influx of
North African refugees. Of course, these type of claims for a stricter Agreement referred to a temporary
(short time) intervention by not reversing the integration process (e.g. France initiated border control after
the 2005 London tube bombings, Portugal did the same during the Euro 2004 tournament). But, the erosion
of Schengen has come to the forefront in a more dedicated way, on the one hand, with the enormous inflow
of third country immigrants since the crisis in Syria and conflict elsewhere triggered approximately 1.8
million irregular border crossings at Europe's external borders in 2015 alone.15 On the other hand, terrorist
attacks (in 2015: Paris; and on Paris to Amsterdam express; in 2016: Brussels; truck attack in Nice, France;
Christmas market attack in Berlin; in 2017: Manchester Arena bombing; bridge attack in London; attacks in
Barcelona) righteously rekindled the need to revise and tighten the Schengen Agreement by bearing in mind
that suburban riots can offer a fertile ground for terrorists. With the request for elaborating further the
Schengen Agreement by keeping abreast of our gloomy times due to unsustainable immigrant patterns and
13 For instance, differentiation can be captured by looking at treaty articles. Schimmelfennig and Winzen (2016) pointed out
that such differentiation became more visible since the 1990s. While differentiation in treaty articles was infinitesimally law in
the enlargements of 1970s and 1980s, its level rose with further enlargements (especially with the accession of Central and
Eastern European countries).
14 Riots also spread to other countries like Sweden and Germany afterwards. By 2016, several exclusion areas, that is to say
‘no-go zones’, have been formed in Sweden where the riots erupted have also proved the poor integration of immigrants.
15 European Commission (2016)
7imminent security issues, and all the more with the effective practice of some Schengen-area states of
reintroducing border controls16 and even extending them17, it not only casts shadows on the future of the
Schengen Agreement, but also illustrates that the compass of the EU integration points to disorientegration.
This tendency was partly fuelled by uncertainty over the socio-economic costs and benefits of EU-
migrants leading to increasing negative perceptions over immigration in general throughout Europe. On the
one hand, numerous studies have tried to measure the economic impact (financial dimension) of EU-
migrants on native people and the economy as a whole in the host country by emphasising that immigrants
can be net contributors to the host country’s wealth-enhancement.18 On the other hand, the picture tends
to be blurred once the spectrum of measurement is widened by taking into account political, social, cultural,
humanitarian, and all other sorts of benefits and costs. Consequently, the perceptions on immigration have
been more or less negative throughout the EU which culminates in “[…] the negative cycle of hostility
towards migration” (BEPA, 2006:4). For example, seductive and often pejorative terminologies used in
media (bogus asylum seekers, welfare tourism, welfare scroungers) and the way the media portrays the
migration issue exert to a large extent influence on public perceptions. Jacomella (2010) sensitively
documented that press narrative plays a crucial role in forming public perceptions in Italy, Germany and
the United Kingdom. Moreover, by surveying 33 developing and developed countries (including for example
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) on misperceptions about migration, IPSOS
showed that citizens generally overestimate the share of immigrants in their respective countries (e.g. the
average guess of citizens surveyed in Germany and Belgium was more than two times higher than the actual
shares).19 Apparently, as Amartya Sen pointed out, free and independent media takes part in the formation
of values (Sen, 2010:336). Good governance and adequately working checks and balances together with
impartial media are therefore the necessary preconditions of more realistic public perceptions over
migration otherwise political populism and seductive press narrative can breed the concerns over insecurity
as well as job losses into the feeling of the public. This in turn reinforces disorientegrational forces.
As far as the differentiation reflecting in the Eurozone architecture is concerned, it mainly
manifested in a core-periphery context due to its inherent anomalies leading to sovereign debt crisis and
ultimately to Eurozone crisis. By the creation of EMU in a unique way, i.e. lifting the monetary policy at
supranational level and leaving fiscal policies in the confines of national economic policy engineering,
European policymakers have lost the general yardstick given by the experiences of long-lastingly performing
monetary unions having fiscal unions as well (e.g. United States, Canada, Switzerland). Without a fiscal
union, we do not have the opportunity to enhance the EMU on the basis of other similar unions because
they do not exist. Nevertheless, much attention has been devoted to investigate whether the EMU
framework has affected positively or negatively the fiscal discipline of member states. Although the picture
is mixed, the fundamental role of internal commitment to a prudent public finance without attributing
significant role to the EMU rules (Beetsma et al. 2009) is often underscored. Against this background, the
EMU framework should have entailed rigorous fiscal adjustments and structural reforms for example in
16 In June 2018, Germany and Austria started to join their police forces to stop illegal migration.
17 The Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament conducted in April 2016 revealed that 66% of surveyed citizens of
28 EU Member States consider EU action to be insufficient and 74% would like to see the EU take more action. Or on the
protection of external borders, 61% consider EU action to be insufficient and 71% would like to see the EU take more action.
See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20160623PVL00111/Europeans-in-2016-Perceptions-and-
expectations-fight-against-terrorism-and-radicalisation Accessed on: 01.06.2018. On how the current circumstances cast
shadow on Schengen, see the Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI (2016). Additionally,
the proposed draft EU budget for 2017 submitted by the European Commission also aims at bettering the management of EU's
external borders and addressing the refugee challenges inside and outside the EU. See:
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IP-16-2347_EN.pdf Accessed on: 01.06.2018
18 In case of 20 OECD countries, see the economic benefits in Battisti et al. (2014). Dustmann and Frattini (2013) presented
evidence that immigrants who arrived in the United Kingdom since 2000 have contributed far more in taxes than they have
received in benefits. Portes (2015) refutes the assumption that migrants in the UK are likely to be welfare seeking by showing
that migrants are underrepresented in benefit claimants. Foged and Peri (2015) showed that immigration had positive effects
on native unskilled wages, employment and occupational mobility in Denmark between 2001 and 2008.
19 See the survey: https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/ipsos-perils-of-perception-charts-2015.pdf Accessed on:
01.06.2018
8case of Greece or Portugal if for no other reason than that the exchange regime tool became no longer
applicable at national levels. The reason why it did not happen can be found in the shortcomings of the
EMU framework. What we have learnt from the history of monetary unions having fiscal unions at the same
time is at least the fact that “no bail-out” clause should be stipulated and credibly pursued (Bordo et al.
2011). Albeit the Maastricht Treaty seemingly guaranteed the “no bail-out” rule on member state debts by
EU governance and the ECB, the credibility of this rule has perceptibly evaporated as the 2008 global crisis
has summoned the techniques of providing rescue packages and purchasing sovereign debt of member
states that are in extreme quagmire. This type of interventionism can be seen as a logical repercussion of
not having a fiscal union. Historically, with a centralised and powerful fiscal policy the union is able to
operate an effective transfer system which can provide a supportive hand in dampening problems arising
at subnational governments affected more seriously. In the absence of a fiscal union and thus that of
effective longer-run constraints, the propensity at member states level to run deficits and public debts was
inherently encoded in the EMU framework. Put it differently, the phenomena of softening rules such as
that of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is often translated as a movement towards a system offering an
increased fiscal room for manoeuvre at national level (Bassetto – Lepetyuk, 2007). Let us recall to the fact
that the SGP was incrementally softened since its establishment.20 Since the original intellectual backing of
the SGP was linked to a proposal of Theo Weigel about “Stability Pact”, and since the pact was softened up
– at German and French requests – by incorporating the aspect of growth and leaving behind the
mechanism of automatic sanctions, this tendency is clearly discernible. Not to mention the SGP’s reform in
2005 that can also be assessed as a step toward higher flexibility (Heipertz – Verdun, 2010). Due to these
developments, SGP has to a large extent lost its role to be an external coercive power in forcing member
states to resort to permanent fiscal adjustments and reforms in the interest of EMU rules. Moreover, more
rules and sanctions added to the SGP will by no means make the pact more useful, simply because the
former version of SGP with numerical rules has completely emptied (see: Caselli, 2008).
Apart from the fact that softening the SGP was equal with the worsening credibility, particularly by
the early 2000s when two non-complying countries (Germany, France) were not sanctioned, this framework
acted as a mechanism which was on the one hand benefiting for core-countries like Germany and France,
and it was counter-incentive for countries like Portugal in implementing necessary fiscal adjustments and
structural reforms. Since the indebtedness in southern Europe, helped by Germany and France, fostered
their imports, a contrario, it also triggered the German exports; and thus this system appeared to be a
desirable one. Nonetheless, the surplus cash stemming from the strengthening exports was being to a large
extent re-allocated into the southern countries in form of loans. The reason why the EMU did not serve
completely as an external enforcement framework is the fact that the German and French governments
would have blocked the flow of increasingly risky loans to the peripheral countries, but their interest groups
would not have left it without a word because this would have led to additional economic slowdown
determined by a decline in demand and workforce layoffs.21 For this reason, the creditor countries were
not interested in breaking up this status quo and therefore closed one of their eyes to the fiscal indiscipline
of the periphery for a relatively long time. The institutional and implementation related differentiation in
EMU framework heightened the hedonic editing of other member states. It refers to a situation when
people are to convince themselves about that their earlier failure does not really matter.22 Its precondition
is the missing fear from fear. Having in mind the consequences of non-compliance which can easily direct
toward the misguided feeling that non-complying the external rules does not really matter, hence fiscal
20 It was sensitively illustrated by Fischer et al. (2006). For a quantitatively assessed SGP-approach see Monperrus-Veroni
and Saraceno (2005) who pointed out its shortcomings to trigger more fiscal discipline. For more on SGP’s shortcomings see
Wyplosz (2002) and Buti et al. (2003).
21 Considering the fact that the German economy underwent a relatively huge slowdown in 2000-2003 (according to Eurostat,
the economic growth was 3.1% in 2000, in contrast, by 2003 it was close to stagnation) would also be instructive in
understanding that the scenario about blocking the above mentioned activity has a strong counter-incentive. Another perhaps
equally telling momentum is the fact that the current account of all credited peripheral countries has deteriorated right after
their accession into the euro area, except Germany whose current account deficit changed rapidly into an increasing surplus.
22 Individuals tend to strategically manipulate their memory to feel less guilty. This was confirmed by experimental economics
literature too, see: Li (2012).
9deficit can soar. This hedonic editing phenomenon was also on the card by serving as a counter-incentive
to be committed to stringent fiscal consolidations and structural reforms by encoding the weakening of the
entire EU.23 The situation was worsen by the time the 2008 financial and economic crisis and its ensuing
Eurozone debt crisis hit in. The inefficient fiscal and monetary stimuli, then the fiscal austerity programmes
geared to curb unsustainable indebtedness have led to further erosion of trust in the EU as the economic
performance has remained rather weak.24 Still, with the astonishing institutional and organisational
innovations in the European economic governance (e.g. introduction of six-pack and two-pack, the
European Semester, the Fiscal Compact, the Euro Plus Pact, and establishing the roadmap towards Banking
Union) the shift from intergovernmental solutions towards EU-level approaches has gained a historical
momentum.
2.3 External processes forming common challenges
As enlargements and deepening progressed, issues to be addressed and tackled have become more and
more intertwined and opaque causing an intrinsic tendency towards non-decisions, endless-discussions and
dissents by planting the seeds of governance deficit at EU level in the perceptions of the wider European
public. This was confirmed by the Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament conducted in April
2016. According to the survey, Europeans feel that EU action is largely insufficient in most of the fifteen
areas suggested to them, and that a massive majority of citizens would like the EU to intervene more than
at present in these areas. The latter one contributed to the widely documented democratic deficit and, of
course, EU scepticism.
Importantly, in addition to the volatile trust level in the EU given by the enlargement process, the
crisis make the case worse together with newly arising external challenging processes. Without attempting
to be exhaustive, we just name a few such as the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict interspersed with the
Annexation of Crimea; conflicts in Libya and Syria triggering migration and refugee crises25; increasing
terrorism activity. What is extremely important is that external common challenges are also reinforcing and
heightening internal challenges either like the exit-prone behaviour in more and more EU Member States
such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, and even in case of Germany26, or like the
emergence of not necessarily EU-conform (potentially anti-democratic) political behaviour in certain
countries (e.g. Hungary and Poland).27 The smouldering decay of trust in the EU and in the integration
process is merely a justification of the empirical finding that recession and turbulent times hurt more than
boom can help when it comes to evaluating subjective well-being, which in turn affects the attitudes
towards the EU as well.28
Eventually, one may lead to the conclusion that European integration has been losing orientation
and facing weakening commitment to integration not only because of anomalies, as the prevailing literature
suggests, but because of inbuilt long-term processes in the path of the integration. Disorientegration is an
echo effect of a complex amalgam of mutually intertwined and interrelated mechanisms (general- and EU-
23 Kovács (2016) illustrated it in case of Hungary.
24 Not to mention the current brewing storm over the unfolding Italian banking crisis since February 2016.
25 This new wave of movement of people was mainly encoded into our world as a result of the hegemonic battles between the
US and Russia even during the cold war and afterwards. As Sachs (2016) shows, their conflicts led to instable states prone to
disintegration and triggering the fleeing mass of people. For example, for the US, the war in Syria is a continuation of the plan
for global US hegemony launched by Defense Secretary and Under Secretary at the Cold War’s end. Tackling the migration
crisis requires collective actions in the spirit of faith community not only in case of refugees but also in case of climate-change-
related migrants. According to estimates, between 25 million to one billion people might be displaced by climate change up to
2050 (IOM, 2009:43).
26 For the German case, see: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/684282/Germany-Eu-referendum-Dexit-Brexit-Angela-
Merkel-european-union Accessed on: 01.06.2018
27 Kornai (2015) documented the U-turn of Hungary thereby it has become a post-communist autocracy. Kovács (2016) called
the system as a Weberian plebiscitary leadership democracy which declared an economic freedom war against Brussels,
against foreign multinationals by injecting additional uncertainties into the innovation ecosystem. In case of Poland, recent
far-reaching changes to its legal and institutional framework directly threaten human rights and undermine the rule of law, as
the report prepared by the Council of Europe (2016) shows.
28 See De Neve et al. (2015)
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specific vectors) embedded secularly into our European integration process. All of the described vectors,
being strongly interlinked and intertwined, are endogenously forming a centrifugal force to
disorientegration and creating ambiguous situations. In the following we address whether the so-called
secular stagnation adds to that centrifugal force and on why a more transformative and catalytic policy mix
is needed.
3. The role of secular stagnation in disorientegration
A new stream of economic literature focuses on the issue of secular stagnation meaning the long-lasting
withering productivity, thus that of innovation performance in the advanced world since the 1970s (Cowen,
2011; Gordon, 2012; Teulings – Baldwin, 2014; Eichengreen et al. 2015).29 Secular stagnation thus means
the perceptible deceleration of growth engine of which main constituents do not seem to have so much
contribution to growth compared to few decades ago. Importantly, secular stagnation is associated with
increasing uncertainties – unknown risks driving the increasing propensity to save and the declining
propensity to invest – leading to increasing instability of the socio-economic system. Even the spillover
effects can be much larger in time of secular stagnation (Eggertsson et al. 2016) contributing to non-linear
changes of uncertainties over the future. There is a growing body of evidence that increases in uncertainty
are mainly associated with protracted negative impetus on economic activity (Baker et al. 2013; Bachmann
et al. 2013). Increasing uncertainty undermines for instance the capacity of the state to fulfil its
developmental function since the sustainability of the welfare state becomes questionable, hence it
reinforces macroeconomic instability.
Omitting the role of secular stagnation from our analysis would be equal to joining the club of
terribles simplificateurs who are inclined to apply merely a reductive vision of progress. At this point, one
must address the issue whether secular stagnation might be a systemic feature of our complex socio-
economic innovation-ecosystem by calling for new policy initiatives.
We argue that secular stagnation is likely to be an autochthon phenomenon in our new techno-
economic paradigm having specific features directing towards lowering productivity (which, of course, is
getting to be harder and harder to be measured). We can claim with reasonable certainty that the
Lundvallian (2002) term of “learning economy” is a resulting condition of the new techno-economic
paradigm (ICT-based, service sector dominant) requiring higher skills and quality as well as permanent
knowledge-development. This new paradigm places innovation and its main barriers and drivers under a
different light. As we indicated in our earlier paper (European Commission, 2011:27), studying innovation
in services is becoming more and more important as the world has now arrived at a new techno-economic
paradigm, exhaustively described by Perez (2009). This concept converges on the thinking of Kondratiev
(1935) and Rennstich (2002), who claim that, beginning with the Industrial Revolution in England at the very
end of the 18th century, the world economy has experienced technological revolutions every 40-60 years.
Each technological revolution employs new or relatively new technologies via the method of smart
combination. The new ICT-based techno-economic paradigm that emerged since the midst of the 1970s not
only provoked profound changes in the production process, but also tailored them to a more service-
oriented economy.30 What is especially important from our viewpoint is that, as services’ dominance
increases with the sophistication of services innovation, the labour productivity becomes significantly lower
than in the manufacturing sector. Statistically, the economy has to a large extent become weightless in the
sense that the intangible assets (ideas, knowledge, social relations etc.), which are so cumbersome to
measure, have started to dominate.31 Additionally, there is an observable correlation between the secularly
(since the 1970s) rising political instability and declining economic performance in the advanced world
29 Robert J. Gordon emphasises that modern innovations are not so impressive and the information revolution does not seem
to be so conducive to economic development and growth (measured in GDP per capita) compared to earlier waves of
innovation, such as the internal combustion engine, electrification or the telephone. See: Gordon (2012).
30 Around 67% of global value-added is in services in the developed and developing economies (see World Bank data). In terms
of employment, only the service sector has exhibited a permanent rise since 1999, reaching 70% of total employment in the EU
in 2009 (European Commission, 2010).
31 See: Haskel and Westlake (2018).
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(including the EU). And the declining economic performance corresponds with the increasing dominance of
services sectors at the expense of manufacturing.32 As a corollary, increasing ‘servitization’ of the innovation
ecosystem (i.e. the increasing importance of intangibles) entailed with lowering measurable productivity by
engendering uncertainties over the effectiveness of policies and governance both at national and EU level
as well. This is not primarily positively conducive to the ethos of the EU integration.33
One should also bear in mind that the new techno-economic paradigm offers more qualitative
outcomes that are harder to be measured adequately in numerical terms. Although inputs to innovation,
by almost every measure, have been rising significantly over the past century, output, as measured by the
trend growth rate of multifactor productivity, has been flat (Brynjolfsson, 2011). Still, the added value of
ICT revolution and its ongoing transformative power – together with nowadays innovations and R&D
activities – result in more qualitative impact what is missed from aggregate statistics like GDP per capita
and its derivatives like productivity.34 Without a paradigm shift in our mind-set which is fiendishly and
exclusively concentrating on the quantifiable aspects of our progress, a self-reinforcing disorientegrative
cycle seems to be appearing in Europe. Our current mind-set indicates that the problem is not the lack of
policies tailored to increase welfare and competitiveness, but their effectiveness and achievements seem
to be questionable and inappropriate since long-term decline in productivity growth and innovativeness is
observable.35 It fuels policy uncertainty which reduces innovation/investment activity. As the Nobel
Laureate Michael Spence argued political instability undermines the evolvement of comprehensive,
responsive, and coherent economic-policy agenda (Spence, 2016). The resulting mixture of mostly
consumption-driven low growth, high unemployment, and rising inequality aggravates further political
instability and fragmentation, which makes the officials’ capacity to implement effective economic policies
more cumbrous.
Finally, it is worth noting that the slowdown of productivity was more abrupt in Europe than for
example in the US, however (Crafts – Toniolo, 2010). It sheds light at least on two things. First, the US
complex innovation ecosystem has been performing relatively better compared to Europe. Second, the
European aspect of secular stagnation implies that some doubts are in order regarding the effectiveness of
economic policy in the past decades. For instance, despite the overregulation and excessive taxation, the
European Union seems to have been falling short in decreasing the poverty and social exclusion since the
approval of its Europe2020 strategy. Nowadays, approximately 6.9 million people are deeply poor in the
European Union (living on $ 4 a day or less) which is nearly the population of Sweden and Ireland combined
or the population of Bulgaria alone.36 Between 2008 and 2014, the number of people at risk of poverty or
social exclusion has grown by 6 million, a trend being diametrically against the target of Europe2020 to
lifting at least 20 million people out of poverty and social exclusion by 2020 compared with 2008. It points
to the pronounced impoverishment the EU has been facing today which undermines trust and confidence
and offers ground for nationalism, EU-scepticism.37 Evidence suggests that Europe needs to find new form
32 See Brady (2016) on globalization and political instability.
33 Credit consumerism is here, especially in Italy where the share of non-performing loans has been growing the fastest pace
by calling for ECB’s intervention in a form of buying those assets. Nevertheless, the demand side of the economy, to pull a
healthier borrowing from banks to SMEs and households, still remains unresolved in a country having two lost decades in
terms of productivity (innovation).
34 This paradigm is mainly dominated by services (as well as ‘servitization of products’) that improve primarily the quality of
life rather than promise a large productivity stimulator effect in a classical way as happened in the product sector decades
before. Consequently, measuring productivity and GDP via a traditional methodology does not fully capture the well-being
enhancing mechanisms of today’s innovations in the advanced world, hence the impression about a downward trend in the
growth of productivity is heightened. See unmeasured data-driven consumption in Mandel (2012), the non-measured part of
our life in Mokyr (2014), and the limits of GDP (e.g. as ironically called Gross Deceptive Product) and productivity to capture
welfare in Aeppel (2015).
35 Halmai (2017) also raised the question „Is it possible to have an efficient economic policy coordination in the current
context?” (Halmai, 2017:15).
36 Data stem from the World Bank.
37 See: Eurostat (2016a:9). In the spirit of ‘always look on the bright side of life’, the European sluggishness in terms of
innovation has its own merit. As the World Inequality Report 2018, prepared by the World Inequality Lab, revealed, income
inequality has been rising both in Western Europe and the United States. Still, the European rise has been much smaller
compared to that of the US. Europe and the United States had similar levels of inequality in 1980. While the top 1% income
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of growth as the Whitworth cannon of poverty eradication as well. This means that more transformative
and catalytic policies are required to meet technological and socio-economic missions due to the fact that
our world economy has become ever more complex, hence the explanatory power of our theories and
earlier empiricism have become strongly worn.38 All in all, secular stagnation phenomena adds to the
increasing disorientegrative force in Europe via rising additional policy related uncertainties.
4. Conclusions
In this contribution we have deciphered the dynamic configuration of processes lurking behind the
European disorientegration phenomena. Despite the consensual rhetoric on disorientegration which
handles it as a relatively new-fangled phenomenon, with a veneer of a complex approach, EU-specific
vectors have been explored that play a key role in directing towards disorientegration. The EU-specific
vectors (disorientegrational conditions as a result of EU enlargement; internal processes within the EU in
which the outlined differences appear; and external processes forming common challenges) are strongly
intertwined and create ambiguous situations by forming a disorientegrative centrifugal trend. In addition,
we have also underlined that the secular stagnation phenomena adds to such disorientegrative trend in
Europe via rising additional policy related uncertainties.
To the extent that there is no common (EU-level) reaction, to such an extent differing national
reactions to certain challenges are growing. And vice-versa, to the extent that national solutions emerge,
to that extent there will be no common solution (collective action). This leads to a contingent situation by
preserving and even worsening the EU’s capability-expectations gap. Since the challenges of the EU make
the socio-economic innovation ecosystem pervaded by a great deal of uncertainty, there is a need for a
contingency aware governance to better coordinate between common tools in supporting resiliency (shock
absorption, risk sharing) and incentive regimes such as the markets to foster fiscal and financial stability
(risk reduction).
Bearing in mind the nature of the European integration, our paper can by no means offer the full
panoply of policy perspectives to be considered by EU level governance and national leaders. Still, and
beyond the usual suggestion of ‘complete the internal market’, by extending our earlier findings on the
general vectors of disorientegration (Kovács, 2018a), our current paper conveys at least six intertwined and
mutually reinforcing potential principles of reversing the European disorientegrative forces in a more
detailed manner.
1) Festina lente: Since the European integration has weakened the democratic sovereignty of the member
states by creating a chasm between far-reaching economic integration and limited political integration,
the principle of festina lente (make haste slowly) is in order when it comes to further European
integration (enlargement and deepening). Bearing in mind the complex set of issues behind secular
disorientegration, the need for an ever-closer union is obvious but with meticulously considered steps
that are (i) rehabilitating the delicate balance between national and European level governance, and (ii)
offering learning while doing and positive psychic capital to gain continuous support for the European
integration project.
2) Value-congruent governance – Fairness and equability: beyond the peace-holder role of the European
integration, one of its main objectives is pursuing human well-being. Keeping in mind the current
context, and the need to revive and strengthen interpersonal and institutional trust, Europe should do
more to serve as a sanctuary of a more equitable distribution of economic prosperity if for no other
share was close to 10% in both regions in 1980, it increased merely up to 12% in 2016 in Western Europe, while the US share
became 20%. Consequently, albeit the European innovation system has been spectacularly outperformed by the US, the
European continent has been experiencing lower level of worsening inequalities.
38 Once the financial sector served the real economy, it is now a parasite of the real economy; previously, if employment
expanded, average wages had risen or at least public revenues were increasing, and this trend cannot be identified today; once
productivity increased, it was accompanied by wage growth, it is not necessarily true today (e.g. just take a mere glimpse onto
the case of the UK of which GDP grew during 2007 and 2015 while the real wages contracted perceptibly).
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reason than the political slogan of “bolstering socially inclusive economic development” has now
completely emptied. To this end, instead of completely eradicating all inequalities, contingency
governance shall reconsider the paradigm of expanding the welfare state by refining its focus on
widening the opportunities of individuals to excel in personal and professional developments
(equability) in reducing the culture of entitlements and to fasten talent development for a more healthy
innovation ecosystem. Putting fairness and equability onto the policy agenda can happen in many ways.
For instance, fostering and supporting the evolution and diffusion of relevant movements like the
Economy for the Common Good can be a great way forward pursuing integrity, responsiveness, fairness
etc. Potential institutional instruments in that direction can be the pro-active cooperation among
independent monetary and fiscal policy institutions and unbiased consulting experts with the aim at
being a regulatory conscience by analysing inexorably the nexus between governmental
measures/policies and fairness/inequality.
3) Broadened complexity aware governance: Encoded disorientegration directs toward a governance
which is not in denial vis-à-vis our complex innovation ecosystem characterised by uncertainty, non-
linearity, unpredictability and emergence. Contingency governance has at least the following
constituent sub-principles.
 Systemic thinking is a must: to address the dynamic configuration of processes related to
disorientegration in the EU or secular stagnation as an endogenous phenomena. For instance, by
taking into account the features of our current ICT-based, services dominated techno-economic
paradigm; or by incorporating the effects of planned policies and measures on inequality all the time
(e.g. how the Capital Markets Union will affect income and wealth inequalities in countries etc.).39 In
addition, establishing a parliamentary committee – in each Member States and in the European
Parliament – for the future to initiate a dialogue on major future problems and opportunities in
recognising important political themes at an early stage by outlining alternatives and different policy
lines is of key interest as well (e.g. regarding the impacts of radical technological change on democracy,
on political structure, on many levels on human beings such as inequality and the future of work etc.).
 Acknowledge our limited knowledge and policy horizon: it credits Harry S. Truman’s words, namely that
experts do not like to be seen to require any additional learning since it would be equal to admitting
that they were previously not those experts the public can build on. In the era of immediacy, policy is
expected to follow arousing tensions and crises in due time but it is impossible. Expecting adequate
and one-shot policy solutions from national and EU-level governance to certain wicked problems is a
naiveté highly resembling to the fatal conceit of Andrej Aleksandrovič Ždanov, the former soviet 
politician, who once ordered artists to create masterpieces. Consequently, there is no and will not be
any buildable supermodel transferable to every member states. Social learning ability still remains the
stove of any socio-economic development by accepting that blossoming quantification can misguide
and distort our evaluations over the effectiveness of various policies in tackling complex challenges
and interpretations over socio-economic phenomenon. Contingency governance is therefore not to
pursue quantophrenia, i.e. the excessive reliance on hard numerical statistics, but to incorporate the
qualitative aspects in a more vigorous way (e.g. the effects of innovation in the public sector shall be
primarily found in well-being enhancing qualitative aspects; when it comes to fostering inclusiveness,
the concept to measure poverty shall be refined because of its shortcomings40). Moreover,
quantophrenic behaviour can be a camouflage in the financial sector-real economy context as well in
the sense that financial sector does not lend enough financial ammunition for those innovative ideas
that are new, but are still initially raw and poorly understood. This way, a bias toward more quantified
39 As Alstadsæter et al. (2017) pinpointed, tax evasion for the rich is easier when they have access to advanced wealth
concealment services whereby they are able to conceal assets and investment income abroad. An integrated Capital Markets
Union will spark those services by potentially exacerbating inequalities in countries.
40 For instance, global poverty lines multiplied by PPP – a method the World Bank, the Sustainable Development Goals are
using – do not capture the differences in the cost of living between cold and warm countries etc. The realistic standard error
for global poverty can even be 200 million! See: Deaton and Dupriez (2011).
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and well established ideas of older vintage exists, however economic history exemplified that new and
more risky ideas spur subsequent inventions more frequently.41
 Experimentalism and empowerment without chasing a utopia: such contingency government is, by its
very nature, deliberately experimental and is to empower the citizens with the aim at accelerating
mistakes and the learning process from them. Once the principle of festina lente is hold, shifting
toward a more political union, toward a more federal-like system is more likely by offering more room
for member states to learn from each other more quickly about policies and measures targeting the
kick-start of productivity growth together with a socially more inclusive European knowledge economy
(e.g. popular referendums, citizen initiatives, pursuing digital platforms as hybrids of direct democracy
and representative democracy when it comes to forming and initiating government actions in a co-
written way). This is the point where the cross-sectoral and cross-actor mind-set must appear.
Complexity-aware collaboration to share risk and responsibility is not primarily an option, but a
coercive necessity in addressing complex challenges and to cultivate the evolvement of a European
faith community via preserving some diversity to guarantee some unity. The impression about and the
reality of limited discretionalism, which is less likely to dismantle the trust infrastructure, can be
safeguarded by building more on collaborative participatory mind-set, especially in turbulent times
pervaded by uncertainties. However, our complex system together with our limited understanding of
it puts a question mark over the effectiveness of such participative governance which can easily
become just a utopia. Albeit some argue that Europe needs more democracy, it might intensify
disorientegration because there are no clear-cut answers and objective consensual opinions in the
wider public over complex issues (e.g. BREXIT voting). For this reason, democratic deficit shall be
mitigated via feeling the pulse of the citizen opinion without triggering negative impetus on
governance and integration. For instance, the introduction of participatory budgeting in the digital age
can be a good way forward as an antidote to right wings populism (i.e. state captured by corrupted
elite) and to dampen the discontent against globalisation (i.e. participative budgeting means discussing
budget-related issues with citizens on public service delivery when it comes to prioritising amongst
different options).42
4) The vast majority comes first: EU governance must continuously demonstrate that it intends to act in
the interest of the vast majority of EU Member States. The real socio-economic development
throughout the becoming EU – i.e. creating conditions for the realisation of human personality – rests
upon our ability to stimulate synergies by influencing the dynamic relationship between core countries
and peripheral ones. In this respect, two sub-principles are in order.
 Grounding differential diagnoses: establishing the culture of differential diagnoses in a more
dedicated way in policymaking and crisis management across the EU (e.g. fiscal consolidations with
different functions in core and periphery countries) is of paramount importance. This might also
dampen the culturally strongly influenced disorientegration in the EU. It would feed into the
increased experimentalism by acknowledging that no mere supranational governance mechanism
featured with one-size-fits-all policies and programmes could address and solve the complex
European disorientegration.
41 Packalen and Bhattacharya (2015) illustrated that in case of the US based on the text of nearly every US patent granted
during 1836-2010. The European R&D statistics also lend support to the higher risk-aversion on the one hand, and the fiscal
incapacity of national public finances to support R&D&I via fiscal incentives (as Eurostat (2016b) shows, the R&D target of
the Europe2020 strategy has not been approached, the progress was more limited in the period 2008-2015).
42 For example, participative budgeting influences prevailing priorities and re-configures the mind-set of resource allocation
according to the perceived and expressed needs. In numerous cases, it contributed to the process of placing customers’
preferences into the forefront, since it resulted in non-negligible changes in the priorities followed by municipal government.
Participatory budgeting can serve as a mechanism for improving the learning curve because of the potentially higher quality
of feedback circle. See: Kovács (2012). What is more, participatory budgeting shall be embedded into a wider insurance scheme
against lax fiscal governance and corruption (i.e. in case of fiscal laxity or detected corruption, transfers shall be channelled
from public administration towards value-congruent investments juxtaposed in a list to be selected via participatory mechanism
as priority making, hence strengthening democracy).
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 Cultivating internal commitment: importantly, despite the unimpeachable and well-documented
fact on disparities among already in and accession countries, the main culprit was predominantly
related to the lack of internal national commitment to stimulate structural change in line with the
requirements of sustainable growth and development after the accession. Success after accession
always depended and still relies on good governance with efficient institutional architecture
embedded into the wider innovation eco-system. An important implication is that addressing
structural weaknesses at national levels cannot be bypassed even by creating fiscal federalism at
EU level with its transfer system. Ameliorated economic freedom as well as improving innovation
ecosystem at national levels shall be paradoxically enforced more directly by supranational
interventions. The task is to eliminate the almost entirely missing fear from fear (instabilities,
imbalances, so, from deterring sanctions) in the Eurozone and in the entire European Union as well
(i.e. imposing sanctions if needed in accordance with the article 126(8) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union; winding up the illusion of cheap money – providing developing
funds in a pulse basis rather than permanently(!); going beyond intergovernmentalism when
needed, but pursuing no-bailout principle43).
5) Fostering competency, openness and future orientation in European governance: EU governance shall
be competent and effective, and be able to select a viable sustained-growth strategy which includes the
mentioned elements. In this regard, trust and confidence of EU citizens must be re-established and
strengthened. It can be achieved through at least two sub-principles.
 Catalysing mission orientation to signal the ability of EU policy in reinvigorating growth: encoded
disorientegration might also offer game-changing opportunity. Growing uncertainty might lower
the political costs of reforms – reforming not only the financial and fiscal, but that of the
institutional architectures44 – because the voters are more likely to accept that the outcome starts
to depend on the weaving relations of various external processes and not mainly (only) on the
governmental actions. Therefore, higher uncertainty and greater macroeconomic volatility
(recessionary periods with grand challenges) can be conducive to brake the gravitational forces
indicated earlier by making reforms to be politically more viable (e.g. mission 1: harmonising the
real economy and the financial sphere by fostering positive green finance to address unsustainable
credit consumerism and consumption patterns to transform the economic model via breaking
secular stagnation; mission 2: reducing the ever-widening gulf of inequality, while to take into
account environmental constraints etc.). Of course, it should be in tandem with regulation and
monitoring of the financial/banking sector45, and we should be modest in our hopes, as Blanchard
(2013) put it.
 Increasing trust through better public services: enormous challenges associated with this
autochthonously increasing fundamental uncertainty call for good governance and innovative
public sector capable of signalling its ability to cope with the challenges by creating and maintaining
necessary trust. Even though the Great Recession seems to be transmogrified into a slow and
rather frail recovery, uncertainties and potential uncertainties have to be diminished by increasing
the legitimacy of public intervention at national levels. This is in line with the festina lente principle
described above that would consist of growth-friendly fiscal consolidations and public sector
43 As the Greek case illustrates, the key to the development of Greece can be the sobering, master role of integration, which
has already started by the EU actually taking over the role of governance. ESM (European Stability Mechanism) means a fiscal
puffer, but not for member states letting their public finances facing continuous indebtedness. This is in line with the
recommendation of German Council of Economic Experts (2013) on Maastricht 2.0.
44 Recently, more and more studies and concept papers have been published on the future of Europe. With respect to the big
issue of „how” to reinvigorate the European integration see Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018), while on the more intriguing
questions of „who” and „when” to unlock synergetic integration, see: Campos and Sturm (2018).
45 For instance, in the spirit of the famous latin question of „Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (Who watches the watchmen?),
financial sector’s regulation should refine the roles of monitoring/auditor companies being in monopoly position to take better
care of their monitoring in fulfilling their original goals that were not considered particularly important before the 2008
financial crisis. On the role of auditors/accountants in the crisis, see: Brooks (2018).
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innovations (PSI).46 Public sector should serve as a demonstrator being in conjunction with an
approach that cultivates innovation, and eventually tries to address as well as alleviate wicked
problems. PSI can be regarded “[...] as the process of generating new ideas and implementing them
to create value for society, covering new or improved processes and services” (European
Commission, 2013:7). PSI may help to maintain the quality of service provision, to reduce excessive
expenditures while not imposing additional burdens on labour and the economy as a whole by
fostering trust building in time when painful measures (e.g. fiscal adjustments, structural reforms)
are inevitable. PSI thus becomes a mechanism towards increasing the quality of governance across
the board.
6) Live in details, think in details by building on complexity economics: since European disorientegration is
a result of the interplay of complex global (and European-wide) and national (member states) vectors,
a pious wish is not enough to frame and ground contingency governance. Governance cannot be based
on generalities but on the continuous discovery and understanding of the reality in detail. Two sub-
principles are arising in this respect.
 Progressing toward complexity economics: economics profession shall go beyond the practice of
considering more complex phenomena as incidental addenda to economic engineering and
theorising. This is the point where the cross-disciplinary mind-set must appear. Contingency
governance shall acknowledge the complexity of the socio-economic innovation ecosystem and
the fact that policy outcomes are not mathematically described economic ones, but complex
patterns. Complexity must be addressed since it forces economics and policymakers to be more
humble by not condemning ambivalence. Without pursuing a complexity based economic
approach47, without acknowledging individual and system-wide interactions (at least most of
them), European economic governance and its macroeconomics backing may indeed be doomed
and policies tend to fall short in becoming the instruments of a sustainable development value-
congruent governance and what any kind of governance will have is just a cacophony of ideas that
are nothing more than a theatre of empty rhetoric.
 Refining approaches to education and skills: the current entire education concept is worth
reconsidering and refocusing in the era of knowledge economy (emerging digital economy
including the development of the new production revolution, that is to say, Industry 4.0) when
learning and work become one and schools must be the voice of the future. Such approach can
embrace not only a more pluralistic education system (including teaching of economics science at
universities48) cultivating cross-sectoral, cross-actor and cross-disciplinary mind-set49, but also the
more organic introduction of various techniques such as new and innovative peer-to-peer learning
programmes without decisive curricula; tri-partite co-creation projects to addressing challenges
rather than solving them once and for all; voucher-based systems, cooperation with the business
sector to co-develop more pleasant work in an era of going digital and robotization etc. Since most
people tend to believe that something is true or false, modern skills and complexity aware
knowledge-based education may help in overcoming such reductionism by suggesting to people
that pluralism and ambiguity are in order, hence they might get a more realistic picture about the
difficulties of economic governance. In this way, the demand side of economic governance, that is
to say, citizens might show higher level of tolerance against economic governance in an era of
perplexingly intertwined complex challenges by feeding into increasing trust in the public sector
and in contingency governance.
46 For more on public sector innovation, see Kovács (2012).
47 For a more detailed discussion on complexity economics, see Kovács (2018b – forthcoming).
48 See more: Csaba (2018).
49 In concordance with the messages of outstanding pedagogues like Paulo Freire (1970), who was a real proponent of an
inter-active education system which is to motivate critical thinking and curiosity, a way towards recognising complexity. His
thinking is of high relevance today when all forms of increasing inequality is observable even in the developed world.
17
In the introduction we cited Milton Friedman, by paraphrasing his famous words, our work conveys that
there is no such thing as free governance and value-free economics, either. In following our line of thinking,
and more than 65 years after Friedman’s essays on positive economics50, it has become vital by now that
the economics of contingency governance should be normative and value-based. And surely, we should be
more modest in our hopes.
50 See: Friedman (1953).
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